The Delhi High Court ruled that in cases initiated before the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the victim was below 16 years of age to sustain a conviction for rape.

The Court made this observation while acquitting a man convicted of allegedly raping an 11-year-old girl in 2005. The Court noted that at the time of the incident, the statutory age of consent was 16, not 18, as amended later.

Consequently, the prosecution was required to establish the victim’s age beyond a reasonable doubt to justify the conviction, which it had failed to do.

[Udai Pal v. State]

The Delhi High Court held that a minor victim changing clothes before a medical examination did not undermine the prosecution's evidence in sexual assault cases.

 Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma dismissed an appeal challenging a conviction under Section 18 read with Section 5(m)(n) of the POCSO Act, 2012 and Section 376AB IPC.

The appellant contended that the victim’s intact hymen and changed clothing created doubt about guilt. The Court ruled that medical findings must be assessed alongside corroborative evidence, including semen traces on the victim’s garments, and procedural irregularities could not negate the prosecution’s case.

The Court affirmed that such factors did not erode the credibility of the victim’s testimony.

[Jai Mangal Mehto v State (Govt NCT Of Delhi)]

The Kerala High Court ruled that a Muslim wife who dissolves her marriage through khula must return the mehr (dower) before claiming maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

The Bench observed that khula is a form of divorce initiated by the wife, wherein she consents to relinquish her marital rights in exchange for release from the marriage.

The Court held that unless the mehr is restored, entitlement to maintenance cannot arise, and clarified that repayment of the dower is a determining factor in assessing a wife’s right to post-divorce maintenance when the dissolution occurs through khula, distinguishing it from other forms of divorce under Muslim law.

A Sessions Court in Jammu and Kashmir sentenced a man to life imprisonment for raping, sexually assaulting, and impregnating his 15-year-old daughter. 

Pronouncing the verdict, Principal Sessions Judge Tahir Khurshid Raina characterised the offence as “a manifestation of extreme depravity and moral collapse,” observing that it should serve as a wake-up call on safeguarding children within homes.

The Court convicted the accused under Sections 376(3) and 506 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, imposed a fine of ₹1 lakh per offence, and directed payment of at least ₹10 lakh in compensation under the Victim Compensation Scheme.

[Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir v X]

The Supreme Court issued notice on a petition by a woman accused of sexually assaulting a 13-year-old boy, challenging Sections 3(1)(a)–(c), 4, and 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, contending that gendered pronouns “he” and “his” rendered the provisions inapplicable to female offenders.

A Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Satish Chandra Sharma stayed further trial court proceedings and agreed to examine whether the Act is gender-neutral.

The petition arose from a Karnataka High Court judgment dated August 18, 2025, which had upheld the applicability of POCSO to female offenders, emphasising the protection of all children irrespective of gender 

[Archana Patil v State of Karnataka & Anr.]

The Kerala High Court closed the writ petition filed by St. Rita’s Public School challenging the Deputy Director of Education’s directive permitting a Muslim student to wear a hijab in class.

The Court recorded that the Class VIII student had chosen to withdraw from the institution and did not wish to pursue the matter further. Observing that the issue had become infructuous, the Court held there was no occasion to examine the constitutional questions raised. The Court further clarified that the student’s departure was voluntary and not the result of coercion by the school management.

[Manager, St Rita's Public School v State of Kerala & ors.]

The Delhi Government issued a notification permitting women to work night shifts in all professional establishments, except liquor shops.

The order required employers to obtain women’s consent before assigning night duties, and capped daily work hours at nine, including meal and rest breaks, and weekly hours at 48.

The notification mandated payment of overtime at twice the normal rate under Section 8 of the Delhi Shops and Establishment Act, 1954. The measure aims to enhance workforce participation while safeguarding employee welfare.

Employers are required to comply with these conditions to ensure both legal adherence and protection of women employees.

The Karnataka High Court, in a recent judgment, dismissed a husband’s appeal seeking divorce on grounds of cruelty, observing that his grievances were trivial and resolvable through mutual understanding.

The Division Bench of Justices Jayant Banerji and Umesh Adiga noted that the husband’s expectation of an “obedient and sincere maid” instead of a life partner reflected an inherently flawed mindset.

The couple, married in 2015, lived together for only ten days before separating. The Court also considered the husband’s refusal to facilitate employee relocation and visa processes. The Court held that the trial court rightly rejected the divorce petition.

The Delhi High Court held that a wife’s right to reside in a shared household under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act remains intact even if her husband has been disowned by his parents.

Justice Sanjeev Narula clarified that the house where the wife lived with her husband and in-laws after marriage qualifies as a shared household.

The Court further stated that her right to residence is independent of her husband’s ownership or title and continues as long as the property remains the shared household where they lived together.

[Khushwant Kaur v Smt. Gagandeep Sidhu & other connected matters]

The Kerala High Court has refused to grant an interim stay on an order issued by the Deputy Director of Education (DDE), Ernakulam, which permitted a Class 8 Muslim student to wear a hijab in school despite the institution’s objection.

The school argued that wearing the hijab violated its dress code and claimed that the student’s parents tried to influence others to adopt religious attire.

The Court noted that the DDE would not take coercive steps against the CBSE school and questioned the need for interim relief.

The matter will be heard next on October 24.

[St Rita's Public School v State of Kerala & Ors]

The Supreme Court has reiterated that under Mohammedan law, a childless Muslim widow is entitled to a fixed one-fourth share of her late husband’s property.

A Division bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra upheld a Bombay High Court ruling that denied a widow’s claim to three-fourths of her husband’s estate.

The Court clarified that this rule applies irrespective of the presence of other heirs and stems from Chapter IV, Verse 12 of the Qur’an.

The Court also held that an agreement to sell executed by the deceased’s brother could not override her inheritance rights since no registered sale deed was executed.

[Zoharbee v Chand Khan & Ors]

The Chhattisgarh High Court held that under Mitakshara law, a Hindu daughter could not inherit her father’s property if he died before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, while a son was alive.

Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas ruled that succession in such cases would be governed by the pre-1956 Mitakshara law, under which even self-acquired property devolved exclusively upon male heirs.

The Court clarified that neither the 1956 Act nor its 2005 amendment applied retrospectively and affirmed that succession in such cases must be governed entirely by the traditional Mitakshara principles.

[Smt. Ragmania (Dead) through LRs v. Jagmet & Ors.]

The Allahabad High Court overturned a 2007 marital rape conviction, holding that sexual intercourse with a wife above 16 years of age before the 2017 Independent Thought v. Union of India ruling did not amount to rape.

The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s 2017 judgment, which read down Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC by raising the age from 15 to 18 years.

The Court clarified that the change applied prospectively.

Considering the incident took place in 2005, it fell within the earlier Exception and could not be prosecuted as rape under the Indian Penal Code.

[Islam @ Paltoo v State of UP]

The Supreme Court issued notice on a plea seeking a uniform, gender-sensitive policy for allotting professional chambers to women advocates across courts and bar associations.

The petition sought reservation or priority allotment for women lawyers, including those with over 25 years of practice on the SCBA waiting list.

During the hearing, Justice Surya Kant questioned the necessity of special preference, noting that nearly 60% of judicial officers are women selected on merit without reservation.

The Bench suggested focusing on infrastructural facilities like court-annexed crèches. Notice was issued to the Union, Supreme Court Secretary General, SCBA, and BCI for their response.

[Bhakti Pasrija & Ors. v UOI & Ors.]